This is an
excerpt (the first few pages) of my essay in the forthcoming book Shades of the Nation: Rethinking Race in
Modern Argentina (Cambridge University Press, 2015), edited by Eduardo
Elena and Paulina Alberto. I'm particularly proud to be part of
this interdisciplinary collection, which includes work by
very talented scholars on what has been for too long a taboo topic in
Argentina: race.
In
early December 2013, several urban centers in Argentina went through a wave of
turmoil that brought to light the sensibilities that have long racialized the
national geography as harbouring a threatening, non-white abyss. In the province of Córdoba, thousands of
police officers demanded a salary increase by withdrawing from the streets and
remaining in their quarters, while undercover officers instigated the looting
of stores in order to create a public demand for their presence. The news of
the lack of police repression quickly spread and thousands of men and women
from poor neighborhoods began storming stores and supermarkets to grab anything
they could, from food to TV sets. The unrest spread to other provinces, most
notably Tucumán. There, the same pattern unfolded: police forces withdrew from
the streets to demand a salary increase and simultaneously organized the sacking
of stores, rapidly prompting more widespread looting. With several cities
shaken by riots, a significant portion of the population felt that the streets
were dissolving amid a vortex formed by the expansiveness of los negros, “the blacks” —the racialized
term used in Argentina to name the poor and people with indigenous or mestizo (mixed) completion.
On
the streets, the social media, and the online forums of Argentine newspapers,
thousands of people called for the violent extermination of “esos negros de mierda,” “those fucking
blacks.” Armed vigilantes promptly began shooting at “los negros” as if the
latter were savage hordes determined to overrun settlers circling the wagons on
a hostile frontier. When La Nación
informed that “a young man” (un joven)
was shot dead in Córdoba, marking the first deadly victim of the violence, most
readers posting comments celebrated his death as an act of civilizing justice.
Many objected to the use of the phrase “a young man” to name what was just un negro.
A reader added to this explicit dehumanization of the victim, “Too bad it’s
only one. I wish there were two hundred negros dead.” Similar comments flooded Tweeter
under the hashtag #Negros de mierda. When
the violence subdued two days later —once the federal government sent forces to
Córdoba and the provincial governments abided by police demands— over ten
people were dead and hundreds were wounded. In those days, many compared the looters
with the Indians that in the nineteenth century threatened the boundaries of Argentine
civilized space. Conservative writer Abel Posse wrote in La Nación that in Tucumán a relative borrowed a shotgun, formed a
vigilante patrol, and locked up his wife and children. He felt as if “un malón” was about to raid their home,
evoking the parties of indigenous combatants on horseback who once controlled
much of the national geography.
The
way that this unrest was experienced and racialized by a
significant portion of the population is notable because Argentina has long
stood out in Latin America as a nation that claimed to be white and racially homogeneous,
due to the salience of European immigration at the turn of the twentieth
century. Furthermore, Argentine political and cultural elites have long
insisted in public that one of the merits of the nation is that “we don’t have
problems of racism.” I personally heard center-left presidential candidate Raúl
Alfonsín repeat this line with conviction at several speeches during the 1983 campaign,
and almost two decades later conservative writer Marcos Aguinis began his book
on the Argentine condition making exactly the same claim. Yet in Argentina this
self-congratulatory narrative about a racism-free society has long coexisted
with the everyday use of a heavily racialized language to name, with disdain, esos negros de mierda: the millions of
Argentines who are explicitly marked as
the despised non-white part of the
nation. This racialization is part of a hierarchical class formation, for “los
negros” also names the poor. Yet that the poor are called “los negros” (and not
something else) reveals how racial sensibilities inform class perceptions in
Argentina. And when “the blacks” appear as a menacing presence on the streets, as
in late 2013, it is common to hear passionate calls —entangled with openly racist
slurs— for their extermination, on the grounds that “los negros” are dangerous and
not fully human.
Several
scholars have noted this contradiction in Argentina between claims to racial
homogeneity and tolerance and the everyday reality of a profoundly racialized
and racist society. As Alejandro Grimson aptly put it, in Argentina
the same person can claim to live in a white nation without racism and add, shortly
thereafter, that half of the population is made up of “negros de mierda.” This tense
oscillation is certainly at the core of the specific configuration of whiteness
in Argentina, but its affective and spatial dimensions have been overlooked. Grimson
and other authors have tackled this paradox by arguing that whiteness in
Argentina is a myth or an ideology: a discourse that misrecognizes the existence
of millions of Argentines of indigenous and mestizo background and seeks to
make invisible, and therefore legitimize, racialized forms of hierarchy. Whiteness
in Argentina does, indeed, have mythical and ideological dimensions, but I hereby
examine it as an affective and geographic
formation that is in denial of its existence because it is not reducible to a conscious ideology and operates at
a pre-discursive, emotional level.
In
this essay, I propose to name this racialized disposition toward space as La Argentina Blanca, White Argentina. I
do not conceive of this term, it is important to note, as a bounded entity made
up of Argentines of white skin. Many of the fiercest critics of La Argentina
Blanca are light-skinned Argentines with blue eyes (such as writer Osvaldo
Bayer)
and some of its staunchest defenders have indigenous ancestry (like
the former governor of the province of Salta, Juan Carlos Romero). I conceive
of White Argentina, first and foremost, as a geographical project and an affective disposition defined by the not always
conscious desire to create, define, and feel
through the bodily navigation of space that the national geography is largely
European. But this is a haunted and ever-incomplete project, a whiteness that
feels under siege, for it permanently confronts that millions of Argentine
citizens bear in their bodies the traces of the non-European substratum of the
nation. White Argentina, in this regard, is an affect in the relational,
inter-subjective, and material sense that Spinoza gives to this concept: the
capacity to affect and to be affected by other bodies. And few things affect
White Argentina more profoundly than the appearance in public space of spatially
expansive multitudes of “negros.”
The
affective nature of White Argentina is apparent in its visceral reaction to events like those of December 2013. While riots
create anxiety and fear in any social setting, in Argentina these fears usually
trigger widespread calls for the mass murder of “los negros,” embodied in the
cry “a esos negros de mierda hay que
matarlos a todos” (“those fucking blacks should all get killed”). These
calls for civilizing and genocidal violence (i.e. this desire to kill all negros) are rationalized as
condemnation of criminality; but they primarily express rage at the evidence that Argentina is not a white nation. The appearance of dark-skinned multitudes affects
White Argentina as if it were a spatially dissolving force that that opens up, from
within the nation, a huge, terrifying outside: an
abyss that resurrects el malón that the founding fathers of White Argentina thought
they had exterminated in the late 1800s, and that Abel Posse’s relative in
Tucumán felt had reappeared in 2013.
El
malón is one of the most extraordinary figures in Argentine history; it alludes
to the indigenous cavalries that for centuries launched stealth, high-speed
attacks on frontier settlements in the pampas of central Argentina and in the tropical
lowlands of the Gran Chaco, reaching the gates of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Santa
Fe and eroding the boundaries of state territoriality. As a
historically-specific configuration, el malón was destroyed by the Argentine state
in the 1870s and 1880s. But el malón can also be examined as a spatial, bodily,
and affective formation that has outlived its original historical conditions.
Indigenous cavalries no longer exist, but the assertive and expansive
spatiality they once represented is still regularly evoked in Argentina. When in
the twenty-first century the term malón
is used to name looters or simply the poor taking to the streets, it evokes to White Argentina the
bodily, tangible return of the barbarisms of the past.
Jacques
Derrida argued that the ghost is something that seemed to have disappeared but always
returns, reappearing again and again. To speak of specters, he wrote, is to
speak of their return. It is in this sense that el malón can be said to be a
ghostly figure in Argentine history: as a force that had allegedly been
destroyed but that continues returning to haunt those who dream of a White
Argentina.